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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

denying the landlord the amount of rent that corresponds to the
diminished value of the property, the Court has left the landlord in
the uncomfortable position of having to speculate on the economic
consequences of granting or refusing the employees' demands. 24
Nevertheless, it is submitted that it is more socially desirable to put
the cost of the decline in housing conditions occasioned by employee
work stoppage on the landlord, since it is he' '3who has the "ultimate
control and responsibility for the building.

2

Thomas D. Giordano

DEVELOPMENTS IN

NEW YORK LAW

Penal Law § 195.00(2): Indictment for official misconduct charging
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct held insufficient
Section 195.00(2) of the New York Penal Law provides that a
public servant 32 is guilty of official misconduct where, to his benefit
or to the injury of another person, he knowingly fails to perform a
duty either "imposed by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his
office. ' 32 Since the section's enactment, however, little guidance
2 The landlord will have to consider whether the advantages gained from not yielding
to employees' demands will justify the risk of loss of rent in a breach of warrant action.
3 47 N.Y.2d at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
"I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(15) (McKinney 1975) defines a public servant as
(a) any public officer or employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof
or of any governmental instrumentality within the state, or (b) any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee. The term public servant
includes a person who has been elected or designated to become a public servant.
- N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 1975) provides:
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with intent to obtain a
benefit or to injure or deprive another person of a benefit:
1. He commits an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized; or
2. He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon
him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
Section 195.00 condensed approximately 30 separate provisions under the former law pertaining to criminal misfeasance and nonfeasance by a public servant in the performance of his
official duties. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00, commentary at 385 (McKinney 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Practice Commentary]. The absence of a precise definition of a "public servant"
under the former penal law necessitated that specific acts or official misfeasance and nonfeasance be delineated. See, e.g., Ch. 676, § 116, [1881] N.Y. Laws 913 (repealed 1965) (former
Penal Law § 1840) ("[njeglecting or refusing to execute process"); id. at § 1176 (former Penal
Law § 1843) ("[neglect of duty by superintendent or overseer of the poor"); id. at § 177a
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has been afforded by the courts to determine whether a specific duty
3 21 the
is "clearly inherent." 32s Recently, in People v. La Carrubba,
Court of Appeals held that an indictment charging a judge with
official misconduct is insufficient where the information concerning
the "clearly inherent duty" violated is limited to reference to spe30
cific provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 1
Suffolk County District Court Judge La Carrubba was indicted
for official misconduct 331 for improperly dismissing a simplified
traffic information filed against a personal friend. 331 Incorporating
by reference Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (the
Code), the indictment charged that Judge La Carrubba's breach of
(former Penal Law § 1842) ("[n]eglect of county officer to make report"); id. at § 120 (former
Penal Law § 1847) ("[m]isconduct in executing search warrant"); id. at § 672 (former Penal
Law § 1872) ("[flraudulently presenting bills or claims to public officers for payment"). The
revision of the law remedied this deficiency. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(15) (McKinney
1975); note 326 supra. The revision of the penal law provisions concerning public officials,
Ch. 1030, [19651 N.Y. Laws 1635 (McKinney), was undertaken because the former laws
regulating official conduct "contained much duplication and unnecessary multiplicity of
detail." Practice Commentary, supra, at 384.
In People v. Goldswer, 48 App. Div. 2d 748, 368 N.Y.S.2d 323 (3d Dep't 1975), aff'd on
other grounds, 39 N.Y.2d 656, 350 N.E.2d 604, 385 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1976), § 195.00 was challenged as unconstitutionally vague. Concluding that "the language clearly apprises a reasonable man of the nature of the acts prohibited and of what conduct is required of him," 48
App. Div. 2d at 748,368 N.Y.S.2d at 324 (citing People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64, 67, 215 N.E.2d
345, 347, 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26-27 (1966)), the Goldswer court rejected the contention that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague.
lu Since the enactment of § 195.00(2), only one reported case had addressed the clearly
inherent duty concept embodied in the provision. See People v. Mackell, 47 App. Div. 2d 209,
366 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1975) (per curiam), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 59, 351 N.E.2d 684, 386
N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976). See also note 353 infra.
3- 46 N.Y.2d 658, 389 N.E.2d 799, 416 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979), rev'g 60 App. Div. 2d 1006,
401 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1978).
3 46 N.Y.2d at 660-61, 389 N.E.2d at 800, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 204; see ABA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1977); note 342 infra. The framers of the Code of Judicial Conduct sought
to establish mandatory standards for judicial behavior. See E.W. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTEs
TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 5 (1973). Although the American Bar Association is powerless
to compel disciplinary procedures for Code violations, id. at 43; see Thode, The Code of
Judicial Conduct-The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 395, 45 states and
the Judicial Conference of the United States, which sets guidelines for federal judges, have
adopted the Code as an enforceable judicial disciplinary standard. Id. at 395-96. The New
York State Bar Association adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct in a slightly revised form.
N.Y. JUD. LAW, art. 2 (McKinney 1975). In New York, violation of the Code by a judge is a
basis for censure or removal. See In re Schamel, 46 App. Div. 2d 236, 382 N.Y.S.2d 39 (3d
Dep't 1974) (per curiam); In re DiLorenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d 401, 330 N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dep't
1972) (per curiam). See also In re Hardt, 72 N.J. 160, 369 A.2d 5 (1977) (per curiam);
Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1975) (en banc).
331 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 195.00(2) (McKinney 1975); note 329 and accompanying text
supra.
32 46 N.Y.2d at 661, 389 N.E.2d at 801, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
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the canonical duties of judicial propriety and impartiality constituted a violation of a "duty . . .clearly inherent in the nature of
[her] office." In denying a motion to dismiss the indictment, the
lower court ruled that where a third party is the intended beneficiary of a judicial act or omission that violates the judicial canons,
the judge is criminally punishable for official misconduct. 34 The
Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously affirmed
without opinion. 35
A divided Court of Appeals reversed, 3 6 observing that the judicial canons were not intended to provide a basis for the imposition
of criminal liability.-7 Writing for the majority, Judge Jones stated
that the Code may not be used to circumscribe a duty "clearly
inherent in the nature of the office, "338 because defining the substan39
tive elements of a crime is a nondelegable legislative function.
Moreover, the majority declared that the provisions of the state
constitution and the Judiciary Law, which provide that the Code be
enforced in disciplinary proceedings before the Commission of Judi'3 Id. at 661, 389 N.E.2d 800-01, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 205. The indictment charged that
Judge LaCarrubba 'with intent to obtain a benefit. . . knowingly refrained from performing
a duty. . . imposed upon her by law or. . .clearly inherent in the nature of her office...
in violation of. . .the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2 and 3." Id. (quoting indictment).
Canon 2 of the Code relates to impropriety or the appearance of impropriety by a judge. ABA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 2 (1977). Canon 3 concerns a judge's impartial and diligent
performance of his duties. Id. See general.ly Thode, The Code of JudicialConduct-TheFirst
Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 395.
33 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County), aff'd, 60 App. Div. 2d
1006, 401 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1978), rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 389 N.E.2d 799, 416 N.Y.S.2d
203 (1979). A "benefit" under the revised penal law is defined as "any gain or advantage to
the beneficiary and includes any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire
or consent of the beneficiary." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(17) (McKinney 1975).
" 60 App. Div. 2d 1006, 401 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1978), rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 389
N.E.2d 799, 416 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979).
31 46 N.Y.2d at 658, 389 N.E.2d at 799, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 203. Judges Gabrielli, Wachtler,
and Fuchsberg joined Judge Jones in the majority opinion. Chief Judge Cooke concurred in
a dissenting opinion written by Judge Jasen.
MI Id. at 660-61, 389 N.E.2d at 802, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
-3 It is arguable that N.Y. VEH. & TRAy. LAW § 207 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979-1980)
may have been applicable to Judge La Carrubba's alleged activities. Section 207(5) provides
that "[a]ny person who disposes of any uniform traffic summons and complaint in any
manner other than that prescribed by law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." If, therefore,
the improper dismissal of the accusatory instrument by Judge La Carrubba constituted a
failure to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law, in this case § 207(5), it would
not have been necessary to consider whether the duty breached was one clearly inherent in
the nature of a judge's office. This statute, however, was not mentioned in the La Carrubba
indictment. See note 333 supra.
-3 46 N.Y.2d at 663, 389 N.E.2d at 802, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 206 (citing People v. Ryan, 267
N.Y. 133, 195 N.E. 822 (1935)).
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cial Conduct, preempt criminal prosecution for canonical violations
unless the conduct also is proscribed by the penal law.3 40 Thus, it
was found that in the absence of an alleged violation of the penal
law the indictment was insufficient. 4 ' The Court concluded that a
contrary holding would permit prosecution of all canonical viola34 2
tions.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jasen emphasized that the scope
of section 195.00(2) was not intended to be limited only to public
officials who breach duties expressly imposed by statute.3 4 3 Observing that a judge is bound to the Code by virtue of its express
incorporation in the Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department, 344 Judge Jasen reasoned that the canons embrace the inherent duties of the judicial office.3 4 5 Accordingly, Judge Jasen opined that the conviction would not infringe upon the legislative
function of defining the substantive elements of official misconduct,
because a duty "clearly inherent in the nature of [a judge's] office"
had been violated. 3 Finally, Judge Jasen argued that the separate
procedures available for judicial discipline should not preempt
criminal prosecution in this case, since the indictment rested
squarely upon section 195.00(2) of the Penal Law, not solely upon

"146 N.Y.2d

at 664, 389 N.E.2d at 802, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
3" Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 200.12 (McKinney 1975) (bribe receiving).
"I2Authorization for the disciplinary sanction of a judicial officer is set forth in the New
York State constitution. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22. Under the former version of article
VI, § 22 of the constitution, a judge could be removed by the Court from the Judiciary "for
cause." N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(a) (1961, amended 1977). See In re MacDowell, 57 App.
Div. 2d 169, 393 N.Y.S.2d 748 (2d Dep't 1977); In re Mertens, 56 App. Div. 2d 456, 392
N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 1977); In re Sarisohn, 26 App. Div. 2d 388, 275 N.Y.S.2d 355 (2d
Dep't 1966) (per curiam). Under the present constitutional provision, instances of cause
warranting removal are: "misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, and conduct, on or off the bench, prejudicial to the administration of
justice. . . ." N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(a). The Commission on Judicial Conduct, which has
replaced the Court on the Judiciary, similarly is empowered to take disciplinary action. Id.
Article 2-A of the Judiciary Law implements the constitutional provisions authorizing the
State Commission on Judicial Conduct. N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 40-48 (McKinney Supp. 19791980). For a discussion of the constitutionality of the amendments, see Frank v. State, 61
App. Div. 2d 466, 402 N.Y.S.2d 860 (2d Dep't 1978).
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 666, 389 N.E.2d at 803, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
3,,The Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department, state in pertinent part that
"f[in the performance of his duties, . . . the judge is in all respects bound by the Canons
of Judicial Ethics." [1978] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 700.5(a); see 46 N.Y.2d at 666-67, 389 N.E.2d
at 804, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 666-67, 389 N.E.2d at 804, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
311Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge Jasen stated that the majority's restrictive construction of the provision directly frustrated the legislative intent to expand the
scope of § 195.00. Id. at 668, 389 N.E.2d at 804-05, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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violations of the judicial canons of ethics. 347
It is suggested that the La CarrubbaCourt properly determined
that a prosecution predicated solely on a violation of the Code represents an improper assumption of the legislative function to define
the elements of a crime. 38 Notwithstanding the implications of the
Court's holding to the contrary, 349 however, it is submitted that a
canonical violation alone may constitute a violation of section
195.00(2) in some cases.3 11 In its apparent haste to prevent unethical
conduct from ever being utilized as a sole predicate for the imposition of criminal sanctions, the La CarrubbaCourt neglected to address what judicial duties, irrespective of the Code, are "clearly
inherent" within the meaning of section 195.00(2).3 5' It is submitted
that where judicial conduct violates both a judicial canon and a
duty clearly inherent under section 195.00(2), no further inquiry
into whether a transgression of an additional penal law provision
has occurred need be made.s 2
311 Id. at 667-68, 389 N.E.2d at 804, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Deciding
that the indictment must be dismissed on the ground that violations of the provisions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, in themselves, cannot support a conviction under § 195.00(2), the
majority declined to consider the broader issue of sufficiency. 46 N.Y.2d at 665, 389 N.E.2d
at 803, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 207. The dissent, however, further found that the indictment was
sufficient in all respects. Id. at 668-69, 389 N.E.2d at 805, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
349 The legislative power of the states to enact laws "creating and defining crimes" has
been termed "absolute," Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 662 (1907), and subject only
to constitutional limitations such as the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, id.
at 662-63. One commentator, addressing federal legislative power, has opined that an acceptable rationale for this conclusion can be predicated on "the implicit constitutional requirements of consensual government under law." L. TamE, AMERIcAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 517, at 286 (1978). Professor Tribe has stated:
Under any theory that finds legitimacy in the supposed consent of the governed

.. .

,

the cooperative exercise of accountable power presupposes the possibility

of tracing every such exercise to a choice made by one of the 'representative'
branches . . . .

Id. A constitutional prohibition against the delegation of legislative functions can be found
in the New York State Constitution, which provides that "[t]he legislative power of this
state shall be vested in the senate and assembly." N.Y. STATE CONsT. art mu, § 1. The purpose
of this enactment was deemed as "prohibiting[ing] the legislature '[f]rom converting . . .
[the government] into a pure democracy, under which the people frame and enact their
own laws.'" People v. Wixson, 79 Misc. 2d 557, 563, 360 N.Y.S.2d 818, 825 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974) (quoting Stanton v. Board of Supervisors, 191 N.Y. 428, 431-32, 84 N.E.
380, 380 (1908)). See People v. Parker, 41 N.Y.2d 21, 359 N.E.2d 348,390 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1976).
' 46 N.Y.2d at 660, 389 N.E.2d at 800, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
See text accompanying note 356 infra.

46 N.Y.2d at 663, 389 N.E.2d at 802, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
The La Carrubba Court apparently rejected the "clearly inherent duty" clause of §
195.00(2) by requiring a separate penal law violation in order to hold a judge criminally
culpable under the provision. The Court neglected to address whether conduct violative of a
'

'2
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Analysis of a judicial misconduct case should commence with
an inquiry into whether the alleged conduct is violative of a clearly
inherent duty. Such a duty has been defined as one which by its
nature clearly places the "public servant . . . on notice as to the
standards he must meet. ' 353 It would not appear unreasonable to
judicial canon may also be a violation of an "inherent duty" under this statute. Thus, the
Court seemingly would countenance holding a judge criminally liable under § 195.00(2) only
where the conduct charged is "enjoined by law." 46 N.Y.2d at 663, 389 N.E.2d at 802, 416
N.Y.S.2d at 206. To the contrary, the lower New York courts have found the legislature's
choice of language indicative of an intent to expand the scope of the statute beyond breaches
of those duties specifically enjoined by law. See, e.g., People v. Mackell, 47 App. Div. 2d 209,
366 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1975) (per curiam), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 59, 351 N.E.2d 684, 386
N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976); People v. Volpicello, 72 Misc. 2d 641, 340 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972). The Mackell Court deemed legislative reform in this area as "conclusively
suggest[ing] a broadening of the prior standard" in rejecting a narrow statutory interpretation of official misconduct. 47 App. Div. 2d at 217, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 181. Under the former
Penal Law, Ch. 676, § 154 [1881] N.Y. Laws (repealed 1965) (former Penal Law § 1857)
("[olmission of duty by public officer"), the duty breached had to be one "enjoined by law."
The phrase "enjoined by law" was interpreted as referring only to duties imposed by statutes.
See, e.g., People v. Knapp, 206 N.Y. 373, 380, 99 N.E. 841, 843-44 (1912). Violations of
departmental rules or regulations, unless specifically adopted by the legislature, constituted
impermissible bases for conviction. People v. McCann, 151 Misc. 792, 794, 273 N.Y.S. 839,
841 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 515, 275 N.Y.S. 887 (1st Dep't
1934). While the revision of the statute, culminating in § 195.00(2), broadened its scope
beyond those duties "enjoined by law," its application is limited to those cases in which the
specific intent to procure a benefit for the actor or a third party was present. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 195.00(2) (McKinney 1975).
Practice Commentary, supra note 327, at 387. The courts have not attempted to
formulate criteria to aid in the determination of what constitutes a clearly inherent duty
within the meaning of § 195.00(2). It is suggested that there are three separate levels of
inquiry which should be addressed in this regard. The duty must be of such a nature as to
give notice to the public servant that a breach could be criminally punishable under the
statute when the requisite intent is shown. The standard generally employed by the courts
has been whether "a reasonable man subject to the statute would be informed of the nature
of the offense prohibited and what is required of him." People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64, 67,
215 N.E.2d 345, 347, 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26-27 (1966). In his commentary, Professor Hechtman
states that "the failure to act must be more than a mere breach of good judgment." Practice
Commentary, supra note 327, at 387. Certainly, the conduct of Judge La Carrubba did not
involve the exercise of judicial discretion. Under this objective standard, the existence of
separate disciplinary proceedings for ethical violations is not to be viewed as a prohibition
against the imposition of criminal penalties where the additional elements of a § 195.00(2)
violation are shown. See TICKET-FxING: THE ASSERTION OF INFLUENCE IN TRAFFIC CAsEs, INTERIM REPORT BY THE N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 11-12 (1977). The use of Code
violations in an indictment, therefore, would not offend the requirement of notice of the
possible criminality of the prohibited acts.
A second analysis to be made involves a consideration of due process requirements as an
impediment to using Code violations to define a clearly inherent duty. It has been argued
that in the attempt to avoid arbitrary enforcement of a statutory provision, a legislative
dilemma is created. L. TRIBE, supra note 348, at § 12-28. Professor Tribe states that "to draft
with narrow particularity is to risk nullification by easy evasion of the legislative purpose; to
draft with great generality is to risk ensnarement of the innocent in a net designed for others."
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include in such considerations the canonical provisions as some evidence in deciding whether the specific activity that the defendant
failed to perform is governed by a duty known to the defendant and
one that rises to a culpable level under section 195.00(2). Concededly, the Code invariably will embrace duties found to be inherent
under section 195.00(2). It is submitted, however, that an additional
substantive element of the crime embodied in the penal law provision - intent to benefit a third person or the public servant himself 54 - distinguishes conduct that by its nature is subject to scruId. at 718. In assessing the inherent duty aspect of § 195.00(2), no due process problem
appears to exist. The inclusion of the mens rea requirement of knowingly omitting to perform
the duty eliminates the possibility of "ensnarement of the innocent." Furthermore, a more
precise drafting of the inherent duty clause of § 195.00(2) would not have been practical in
that the provision was intended to cover culpable omissions by all public servants.
A final consideration should be the magnitude of the duty charged in the indictment in
relation to other duties inherent in a particular office. Even under a very restrictive interpretation of § 195.00(2), the primary duty to be performed by a public servant would be "clearly
inherent in the nature of his office." It is submitted that judicial impartiality is the primary
duty of a judge. The expectation by parties to an action of impartial treatment goes to the
very essence of judicial integrity. Admittedly, it is necessary to examine the nature of each
office when dealing with other public servants. Under a primary duty analysis, however, this
requirement does not appear to be particularly burdensome.
A more expansive approach in defining a duty clearly inherent in the nature of a public
servant's office was taken in People v. Mackell, 47 App. Div. 2d 209, 366 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d
Dep't 1975) (per curiam), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 59, 351 N.E.2d 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976). In
Mackell, the court stated that where a district attorney abuses his discretion in choosing not
to prosecute a case, a permissible basis for a charge of official misconduct under § 195.00(2)
may exist. 47 App. Div. 2d at 217, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 181. Since a finding of criminal intent is
necessary to convict under the statute, however, the second department would not impose
criminal liability where such misconduct arises from mere "stupidity" or "veniality." Id. at
218-19, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The Mackell decision presents an expansive interpretation of §
195.00(2) in that once the requisite intent is demonstrated, the failure to prosecute may be
criminal even though the decision not to prosecute is discretionary. See 9 J. Zarr, NEW YORK
CRIMINAL PRACTICE T 81.2[21 (1976). Mackell, therefore, indicates that the existence of discretion does not necessarily imply that there may be no criminal liability under § 195.00(2).
Since the duty constituting the basis of the indictment in La Carrubbadid not involve the
exercise of discretion, this issue was not considered. Additionally, the requirement of a corrupt motive, while at issue in Mackell, was not disputed in La Carrubba.The La Carrubba
Court did not deny the ethical impropriety of the defendant's conduct but merely stated that
"although unquestionably to be condemned, [it] lrovide[s] no predicate for the imposition
of criminal penalties." 46 N.Y.2d at 664, 389 N.E.2d at 802, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 206. Unquestionably, under the Mackell analysis, Judge La Carrubba's omission to perform a
nondiscretionaryduty would constitute official misconduct when knowingly performed. This
is not to say that the Mackell rationale would permit criminal sanctions to be imposed
whenever the duty under consideration is not couched with discretion; it must still be clearly
inherent in the nature of the office. Mackell does indicate, however, a willingness to consider
a broader range of duties as falling within the clearly inherent provision of § 195.00(2).
3$' Under § 195.00, the indictment must allege a motive which is "culpable" or "venal"
in nature and is "directly connected with the duty which the public servant refrained from
performing." People v. Thompson, 58 Misc. 2d 511, 513, 296 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (Saratoga
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tiny only in a disciplinary proceeding from conduct that may give
rise to criminal culpability under section 195.00(2).11
The majority's apparent rejection of canonical violations as sole
predicates for the imposition of criminal liability under section
195.00(2), even if the underlying conduct is violative of a clearly
inherent duty, would appear to have rendered the penal law section
unavailable in judicial misconduct cases.35 Until the Court modifies
County Ct. 1969). This feature of the new law has been called "especially noteworthy and
important" in that, in addition to an intentional omission, a culpable motive is required to
justify the imposition of criminal penalties. Practice Commentary, supra note 327, at 388.
The omission must result from more than mere "laxity" on the part of the defendant in the
performance of a nondiscretionary duty. Id.; see E. MARKs & L. PAPERNO, CRIMINAL LAw IN
NEW YORK § 446 (1967). "[Ihe public servant must know of the existence of such nondiscretionary duty to act . . . [and] the duty to act [must be] so clear that the public
servant is on notice as to the standards that he must meet." Practice Commentary, supra
note 327, at 387 (citation omitted). At least one court, however; has not distinguished those
duties which are discretionary from those which are not. See People v. Mackell, 47 App. Div.
2d 209, 366 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1975), affl'd, 40 N.Y.2d 59, 351 N.E.2d 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d
37 (1976).
2 See generally 46 N.Y.2d at 668, 389 N.E.2d at 804, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting). While the majority contended that the intent to obtain a benefit is present in
most cases of unethical conduct, 46 N.Y.2d at 665, 389 N.E.2d at 803, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 207,
this supposition seems rebuttable. One lower court held that "[t]he appearance from which
favored treatment can be deduced, even without real foundation, can be very harmful to the
administration of justice," and warranted censure without a finding that preferential treatment was actually given. In re Suglia, 36 App. Div. 2d 326, 327, 320 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (1st
Dep't 1971) (per curiam). Even where no finding of an actual neglect of duty evincing such
intent has been reached, conduct which is "injudicious" has been deemed unethical under
Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See In re Vaccaro, 409 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1011
(Ct. Jud. 1977). Other instances of improper conduct by a judge in which the intent to obtain
a benefit is not present relate to non-courtroom activity. See, e.g., In re Lee, 336 So.2d 1175
(Fla. 1976); In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). In every case where criminal
sanctions would be deemed appropriate, therefore, it would appear that disciplinary proceedings would be available against a judge. While a neglect of duty would not prohibit such
disciplinary action, a negligent omission is not criminally punishable. The decisive factor in
the analysis of a judge's conduct is the existence of criminal intent.
In light of La Carrubba,it appears that criminal sanctions for judicial misconduct will
be available only in those cases falling under other specific statutory provisions. See, e.g.,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 200.12 (McKinney 1975) (bribe receiving); id. at § 200.27 (accepting reward
for official misconduct); id. at § 200.35 (accepting unlawful gratuities). It should be noted,
however, that these separate public offenses deal exclusively with acts of commission. Although judicial misfeasance is criminally punishable under either of these separate offenses
of § 195.00(1), which has been left untouched by the La Carrubbaholding, criminal liability
for culpable judicial omissions may be precluded where the omission does not violate a duty
imposed by law.
Finally, a construction of the statute rendering its application ineffective seems clearly
opposed to enumerated principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. § 144
(McKinney 1971). Section 144 states:
A construction which would render a statute ineffective must be avoided, and
as between two constructions of an act, one of which renders it practically nugatory
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its holding in La Carrubba, the anomaly exists that indictments
alleging violations of clearly inherent duties may survive, provided
no reference is made to a violation of canonical provisions. 5 '
Thomas M. Cerabino

Statements of victim in response to inquiriesdeemed spontaneous
declarations
The spontaneous declaration exception 38 to the rule against
hearsay evidence, 311 often imprecisely viewed as falling within the
res gestae doctrine,3 0 renders statements spontaneously uttered
and the other enables the evident purposes of the Legislature to be effectuated, the
latter is preferred.
Id.
An evidently broad legislative purpose seems to have been enunciated in this regard.
3 Consequently, under the La Carrubba holding, an indictment not specifically referring to the Code of Judicial Conduct, but describing conduct or omissions in violation of one
of its provisions, may survive a challenge of insufficiency under § 195.00(2). Notwithstanding
La Carrubba'spotential for creating such technical distinctions, where an indictment does
not incorporate by reference the Code of Judicial Conduct, the availability of § 195.00(2) in
cases of judicial nonfeasance should not be precluded. Clarification of the scope of this
provision by the legislature ultimately may be essential for its proper interpretation.
See note 361 and accompanying text infra.
' The hearsay rule excludes out-of-court statements from evidence only when they are
used to establish the truth of their content. E. FIscH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 756, at 446 (2d
§ 200, at 176 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973). See generally
ed. 1977); W. RICHARDSON, EVIDEN
Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1138, 1139-45 (1935). Thus, extrajudicial declarations that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not
subject to the prohibition of the hearsay rule. See Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 72 P.2d 425
(1937); W. RICHARDSON, supra, § 203, at 180; 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1745 (3d ed. 1940);
32 CORNELL L.Q. 115, 115-16 (1946). The primary justification for the exclusion of hearsay
testimony is the unavailability of cross-examination to test its strength and accuracy. See
W. RICHARDSON, supra, § 201; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra, §§ 1361-62.
People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 230, 342 N.E.2d 496, 499, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698
(1975); see E. FISCH, supra note 359, § 1001, at 579-80; W. RICHARDSON, supra note 359, § 281,
at 246-48. Res gestae literally means "the thing done." Id. at § 279. Unfortunately, a precise
definition of the term, as it is applied in the law of evidence, has not been formulated because
it has been used by the courts in a variety of factual circumstances. Id. One of the situations
in which the res gestae principle is invoked involves ambiguous conduct that requires an
explanation in order to be given a specific legal effect. Commonly referred to as the "verbal
act" doctrine, this rule of evidence authorizes the admission of a statement that accompanies
and characterizes a particular transaction. See E. FiSCH, supra note 359, § 762, at 452; W.
RICHARDSON, supra note 359, § 280, at 244-45; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 359, § 1772, at 19091. For example, a transfer of money can be effected for several reasons and therefore is, by
itself, equivocal conduct. If at the same time, however, the transferor says, "Here is the
money I borrowed from you," the transaction can be construed as constituting the repayment
of a loan. See E. FIscH, supra note 359, § 762, at 452. To be admissible under the verbal act

